Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) have become an increasingly common technology in law enforcement. These systems, often mounted on police cars, are designed to automatically capture and record license plate information from vehicles on the road. Originally developed to identify stolen vehicles and track down wanted criminals, the use of ALPRs has expanded significantly, raising important questions about privacy and data collection. This article delves into how Cop Cars Scan License Plates, the technology behind it, and the growing concerns surrounding its use.
What Are Automatic License Plate Readers?
Automatic License Plate Readers are sophisticated surveillance devices that utilize optical character recognition (OCR) to read and convert images of license plates into alphanumeric data. These systems consist of specialized cameras, processing hardware, and software capable of capturing images of license plates, often at high speeds and in various weather conditions.
Mounted on police vehicles or fixed locations like traffic lights and highway overpasses, ALPRs operate by capturing images of every license plate that passes within their field of view. The system then instantly processes these images, extracting the license plate number, and often recording the date, time, and geographical location of the scan.
This data is then compared against databases, often referred to as “hot lists,” which contain license plates of interest. These lists can include vehicles associated with outstanding warrants, stolen vehicles, expired registrations, or individuals under investigation. If a scanned license plate matches an entry on the hot list, the system alerts law enforcement officers, enabling them to take immediate action.
Modern ALPR systems are highly advanced, capable of processing thousands of license plates per hour. According to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, “the number of license plates that can be read is limited only by the number of vehicles passing the cameras.” This capability underscores the potential for mass data collection, even from individuals not suspected of any wrongdoing.
The Problem with Mass License Plate Scanning
While ALPR technology can be a valuable tool for law enforcement in certain situations, the indiscriminate nature of data collection raises significant privacy concerns. The core issue is that ALPRs record every license plate they scan, not just those that are flagged as being on a “hot list.” This means vast amounts of data are collected on ordinary citizens who are not suspected of any crime.
Consider the example of the Rhinebeck Police Department, which scanned 164,043 license plates in a three-month period, yet only eight of these plates were of interest. This represents a 99.99 percent “failure rate” in terms of identifying actual targets, highlighting the immense scale of data collection on innocent individuals.
The implications of this mass surveillance are profound. As the International Association of Chiefs of Police has warned, ALPRs can collect data from vehicles parked at sensitive locations such as “addiction counseling meetings, doctors’ offices, health clinics, or even staging areas for political protests.” This capability can have a “chilling effect on social and political activities,” as people may be less likely to engage in activities if they know their movements are being tracked and recorded.
Furthermore, the data collected by ALPRs can be stored indefinitely and potentially shared with other agencies or even private companies. This creates a comprehensive record of an individual’s movements over time, revealing patterns and habits that can paint an incredibly detailed picture of their lives.
To illustrate this, the City of Beacon Police Department provided records of its ALPR scans to the NYCLU. Analysis of just one week of data for a single car revealed 24 separate location recordings. By using mapping software, it was possible to track the car’s presence on Main Street in Beacon, even indicating when the driver likely parked overnight. This small sample demonstrates the potential for ALPRs to compile intimate details about individuals, even when they have committed no offense.
With widespread deployment of ALPRs, long-term data storage, and advanced analytical tools, the technology has the capacity to create a massive government database detailing the movements and associations of countless individuals. This level of surveillance raises serious questions about privacy rights and the potential for misuse of this information.
ALPR Ownership and Data Access
ALPR technology is not limited to large metropolitan police departments. As of 2013, the Division of Criminal Justice Services had funded over 422 ALPR systems across New York State, ensuring that every county had access to this technology. In addition, state-level agencies like the New York State Police and the Department of Motor Vehicles also utilize ALPRs.
Even small towns and villages have adopted ALPR systems, demonstrating the widespread availability of this technology. For instance, municipalities with populations under 3,000 residents have been equipped with ALPRs. In major cities like New York City, the NYPD operates hundreds of ALPRs as part of its Domain Awareness System, a vast network of surveillance tools.
Data collected by ALPRs is often shared among various law enforcement agencies. Regional intelligence centers, such as the Westchester Intelligence Center and the Albany Crime Analysis Center, facilitate data sharing between federal, state, and local agencies.
Moreover, some law enforcement agencies are contracting with private companies like Vigilant Solutions, which maintain massive databases of license plate data collected from both private and law enforcement sources. Vigilant Solutions, for example, boasts a database of billions of license plate records and adds millions more data points each month. Access to such commercial databases significantly expands the surveillance capabilities of law enforcement, allowing them to track vehicles across vast geographical areas and access years of historical location data.
This interconnected web of ALPR systems and data sharing agreements means that an individual’s movements can be tracked across jurisdictions and stored in both government and private databases, further amplifying privacy concerns.
Lack of Regulation and Policy
A significant issue with ALPR technology is the absence of consistent regulations and policies governing its use. In many areas, there are no statewide rules dictating how ALPRs should be used, what data can be collected, how long it can be stored, or who can access it. This lack of oversight has resulted in a patchwork of local policies that vary widely in their levels of privacy protection.
For example, in Westchester County, despite having a high concentration of ALPRs, the Department of Public Safety initially had no written policy regarding their use, data storage, access, or sharing. They planned to retain location data for a year, even though the vast majority of scans yielded no actionable intelligence. Similarly, Yonkers, another city in Westchester County, admitted to indefinitely storing all ALPR data collected, again without a clear policy framework.
The absence of robust privacy protections and clear guidelines creates a significant risk of abuse and mission creep. Without proper oversight, ALPR data could be used for purposes beyond their original intent, potentially targeting individuals based on their political beliefs, religious affiliations, or other protected characteristics.
To mitigate these risks, it is crucial for local and state governments to adopt comprehensive policies that address public privacy concerns. These policies should include provisions for data minimization, limiting data retention periods, ensuring data security, and providing transparency and accountability in ALPR usage.
For more information on the nationwide use of ALPRs, refer to the ACLU report: You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements.
DOCUMENTS
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
2012-07-30 FOIL Request
2013-08-27 FOIL Response
New York City Police Department
2014-01-07 FOIL Request
FOIL Response
New York City Comptroller
2015-04-09 Vigilant Solutions Contract
Localities Outside of New York City
FOIL Request to Non-New York City Localities, including:
- Albany County Sheriff’s Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Ardsley Village
- Beacon City
- Bedford Town
- Blooming Grove
- Bronxville
- Chatham Village
- Chestertown
- Colonie Police Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4)
- Columbia County Sheriff
- Croton-on-Hudson Village
- Deerpark Town
- Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections
- Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office
- Fishkill Town
- Greenburgh Town
- Hudson (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- Irvington Village
- Mamaroneck Town
- Mamaroneck Village
- Middletown City
- Monroe
- Mount Hope Town
- Mount Pleasant Town
- New Castle Town
- New Paltz Town
- New Rochelle City
- New Windsor Town
- Newburgh City
- Newburgh Town
- Orange County Probation Department
- Orangetown
- Ossining Village
- Peekskill City
- Pelham Village
- Port Jervis City
- Poughkeepsie City
- Poughkeepsie Town
- Rensselaer County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Rhinebeck Village
- Rockland County Sheriff
- Saratoga County Sheriff
- Saratoga Springs (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Saugerties
- Scarsdale Village
- Schenectady Police Department (Parts 1, 2)
- Shawangunk Town
- Sleepy Hollow
- Spring Valley Village
- Stony Point Town
- Sullivan County
- Ulster Town
- Warren County
- Warwick Town
- Washington County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
- Westchester County Department of Public Safety
- Yonkers City
- Yorktown Town
Footnotes
1 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, License Plate Reader Suggested Guidelines, Jan. 2011 at p. 6, available at http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/pdfdocs/finallprguidelines01272011a.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at p.7.
5 Id. at p.6.
6 Rhinebeck Police Department FOIL Response: Quarterly License Plate Reader Progress Report Apr.-Jun 2011.
7 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Privacy Impact Assessment Report for Utilization of License Plate Readers (Sept. 2009) at p. 2, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf.
8 Id. at p.13.
9 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Response (Aug. 27, 2013).
10 Population numbers and area are from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-34.pdf
11 Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, NYPD, Nov. 12, 2014.
12 See, e.g., Ardsley Village FOIL Response; Bedford Town FOIL Response;
13 See, e.g., Colonie PD FOIL Response.
14 Vigilant Solutions Scope of Work.
15 DCJS FOIL Response.
16 Westchester County Department of Public Safety FOIL Response.
17 Id..
18 City of Yonkers FOIL Response.
19 Id.
